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Abstract:  Managers have been managing earnings especially through accruals for their personal benefits. 
This led to collapse of companies and loss of investments around the world. Audit committee is identified as 
an internal corporate governance mechanism that can monitor the managers and mitigate earnings 
management though with mixed result. The focus of this study is to examine whether female audit 
committee member who is also members of other board committee have a role in curbing opportunistic 
earnings management. However, some argue that gender has no additional value and overlapping overburden 
the audit committee members, which affect their monitoring performance and ability to mitigate earning 
management. This study uses modified Jones model as a proxy for earning management and document how 
inclusion of female overlapping director in an audit committee mitigates opportunistic earning management.  
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1. Introduction 
In the process of conveying firm performance to 
shareholders and other stakeholders through 
financial reporting, managers are motivated to 
influence that process for their own personal 
benefit (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). The series of 
financial scandals and frauds such as Xerox and 
Enron were typical examples (Stubben, 2010). In 
Nigeria, the financial scandal at African Petroleum 
(AP) in 2009, Cadbury in 2006, collapse of 36 
banks between  1994 and 2003, and additional 
eight banks in 2009 were examples of earnings 
management (Abdullahi, Enyinna, & Stella, 2010; 
Gunu, 2009; Sanusi, 2010; Okaro & Okafor, 2013). 
Equally, the increase in financial fraud from 18.2 
% in 2008 to 31% in 2012 (NDIC, 2014) is another 
source of concern.  Earnings management became 
rampant due to the over reliance on earnings as a 
yardstick for investment decisions and basis for 
rewarding management (Schipper, 1989; Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1978; Xiong, 2006). To achieve this, 
managers use different methods such as changes in 
accounting methods (for example changing 
methods of calculating depreciation), 
overproduction to reduce cost of goods sold 
(COGS), and accruals (Dechow, 1994; 
Roychowdhury, 2006; Spohr,  2005). However, 
changes in accounting methods is decribed as 
unpopular because it cannot last long before the 
users of financial reports detect it ( Spohr, 2005). 
Hence, shifting to the use of accruals method. The 
discreationary accrual will be used to measure 
earnings management in this study. 
In an effort to find a solution to earnings 
management and to reestablish the confidence of 
investors’, researchers and regulators have 
recommend the institutionalization of good 
corporate governance (Man & Wong, 2013). In 
view of this, many countries came up with code of 
corporate governance.  Examples of these codes  
are the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) 1999 , 
Sarbanes-Oxely Act (U.S. Congress, 2002, Sec. 
407) in the US, Smith Committee and Cadbury  
reports in the United Kingdom 2003, and the 
“Viénot, 1995, 1999”, Bouton 2002 reports in 
France. In Nigeria, the formal code of corporate 
governance was issued in 2003. These codes 
emphasized the importance of board of directors 
that oversee the activities of the management. 
According to Dobija (2015), due to the diverse 
roles and functions of the board of directors, the 
board delegates the oversight functions of 
overseeing financial reporting process including 
external audit to the audit committee.  
 Financial reporting process involves the procedure 
of producing financial statements, which is subject 
to audit. The reason why shareholders and 
regulatory agencies insist on having an external 
person believe to be “independent” to audit the 
books of accounts of a firm, is that they do not trust 
the reliability of the report prepared by the 
managers (Lambert, 2001).  Therefore, audit 
committee provides an interface between the 
external auditors and the managers. It monitors the 
management actions on behalf of the board. 
According to Crişan and Fülöp (2014), Klein 
(2002), and Vafeas (2005), audit committee 
effectiveness depends on its characteristics. These 
characteristics include but not limited to gender 
balance and overlapping. In this regard, prior 
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studies have been conducted on the association 
between audit committee gender and overlapping 
on one hand, and earnings management on the 
other though in isolation (For example, Arun and 
Arabi, 2015; Lakhal, Aguir, Lakhal and Malek , 
2015; Habib and Bhuiyan, 2016,; Kyaw, Olugbode 
and Petracci , 2015; Sáenz González and García-
Meca, 2014). However, there is dearth of study on 
the effect of overlapping female director on 
earnings management. This study focuses on 
female audit committee members who are at the 
same time members of other board committee in 
association with earnings management.  
 The results of this study are expected to benefit 
investors and policy makers who want to look at 
corporate governance especially effectiveness of 
audit committee from different perspective prior to 
investment decisions or policy initiative. 
2. Literature Review  and Hypothesis 
Development 
The introduction of audit committee in the 20
th
 
century is to offer an interface between external 
auditors and managers with the aim of enhancing 
the quality and integrity of financial reports 
prepared by the managers (Crişan & Fülöp, 2014; 
Imhoff, 2003). This is as result of mistrust between 
the shareholders and the mangers envisaged by the 
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling , 1976). The 
mistrust necessitates independent verification of the 
financial reports prepared by the managers with the 
aim of enhancing their integrity. The shareholders 
see managers as “necessary evils” engaged due to 
the separation of ownership and control in a large 
organization (Fama & Jensen, 1983). In Nigeria 
audit committee was first introduced in 1990 by the 
Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA, 1990), 
being the general corporate governance law. 
However, the formal code of corporate governance 
came into existence in 2003 and revised in 2011 
issued by the Security and Exchange Commission 
(SEC).   
To emphasize the importance of audit committee in 
mitigating earnings management, Dechow, Sloan, 
& Sweeney (1996) argue that the likelihood for 
firms with an audit committee to manage earnings 
is lower, compared to those without. Nevertheless, 
other studies argue that mere presence of audit 
committee without the committee possessing some 
qualities hardly mitigate earnings management 
(Vafeas, 2005). These qualities include the 
inclusion of female in the audit committee. 
However, extant studies document inconsistency 
on the effect of gender on the audit committee and 
earnings management. Some studies argue that 
audit committee functions effectively when it is 
gender balanced especially in favor of women. 
Diverse boards according to Adams and  Ferreira 
(2008) are tougher monitors on management. 
Another research by Wilson and Altanlar (2009) in 
UK documents that a female director on the board 
of directors lessens the risk of insolvency and 
increase accountability. Therefore, with increased 
accountability the possibility of engaging in 
earning management deceases. Accordingly, 
Ittonen, Miettinen and Vahama (2009) exert that 
when women chair the  audit committee , the  
confidence of external auditors increases which 
decrease the need for assurance.  Additionally, 
Thiruvadi and Huang (2011) opined that female 
audit committee member increased negative 
accruals. In the same vein, a negative association 
between audit committee gender and earnings 
management has been established by many 
researchers (For example, Arun & Arabi, 2015; 
Lakhal, Aguir, Lakhal & Malek , 2015; Kyaw, 
Olugbode & Petracci , 2015). 
On the other hand, Kesner (1988) contends that the 
issue of gender is just for the  women’s progress to 
climb the top of the corporate ladder, not necessary 
their prospective contribution. Equally, Brancato 
and Patterson (1999) argued that diversity in favor 
of women has nothing to do with additional value 
but mere tokenism to reflect equality 
Similarly, divergent views were established on the 
impact of audit committee overlapping on earnings 
management. Overlapping is said to occur when a 
director is a member of more than one board 
committee including audit committee.  It is a 
tradition of the board to form smaller committees 
including the statutory audit committee as most 
significant resolutions take place made within such 
smaller groups (Kesner, 1988). Audit committee 
being a statutory committee requires a commitment 
of time by members in order to provide the needed 
monitoring and interface between external auditors 
and the management. In a situation where members 
are over burden by other sub-committee 
assignment, that commitment of time may likely 
reduce, which can give way to opportunistic 
earnings management by the managers. It is argued 
that overlapping could affect the frequency of 
meetings by the audit committee especially when 
the chair of the other committees happen to be 
more proactive compared to that of the audit 
committee. Therefore, as the number of audit 
committee meetings reduce to engage the auditors 
and monitor the management, the possibility of 
earnings management increases (Sáenz González & 
García-Meca, 2014; Soliman & Ragab , 2014) . 
In contrast, Habib and Bhuiyan (2016) established 
a strong positive relationship between audit 
committee overlapping and financial reporting 
quality using discretionary accrual as a proxy for 
financial reporting quality. Additionally, Ferris et 
al. (2003) find that overlapping directors attend 
more meetings than the non-overlapping ones. 
Their study also rejected the busyness hypothesis 
that overlapping directors become overcommitted 
which affect their monitoring performance 
negatively. These suggest that overlapping allows a 
director to acquire information from other 
committees that can enhance his role as an audit 
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committee member. Since managers engage in 
earnings management to maximize their 
compensation in an incentive- based agreement, 
coordination between compensation and audit 
committee through overlapping allow the later to 
be an effective monitor (Liao & Hsu, 2013).  
 Therefore, based on the opposing arguments on the 
isolated impact of gender and overlapping of the 
audit committee on earnings management, this 
study assumes that overlapping female audit 
committee might have an impact on earnings 
management.  
The following non-directional hypothesis is 
developed: 
 H1: There is association between overlapping 
female audit committee member and earnings 
management in Nigeria. 
3. Conceptual Framework 
The framework 3.1 below presents the conceptual 
framework of the study. It depicts the relationship 
between the independent variable and the 
dependent variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent Variables     Dependent Variable 
    Framework 3.1 
 
4. Methodology 
This study will employ multiple 
regressions to measure the relationship 
between audit committee gender, audit 
committee overlapping and earnings 
management. The modified Jones model 
(1995) is to be used to measure 
discretionary accruals; audit committee 
gender is the number of female directors 
on the audit committee, audit committee 
overlapping is the percentage of audit 
committee members who are members of 
another committee. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Prior studies have examined the role of 
gender and overlapping of audit 
committee in mitigating earnings 
management in isolation. This study is 
unique being the first to research on the 
impact of female overlapping audit 
committee members in mitigating earnings 
management in Nigeria. This study helps 
investors in assessing the strength of audit 
committee prior to investment decisions.  
The regulators will find the result useful 
and as a basis for encouraging the 
involvement of women in audit committee 
along other, various board committees. 
This would enhance their capability and 
experience; thereby improve their ability 
to monitor management. However, the 
study is not specific as to what board 
committee is more relevant to female 
director to belong apart from the audit 
committee.  
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